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Consume or Invest:
What Do/Should Agency Leaders Maximize?
William E. Kovacic & David A. Hyman1
Abstract
In the regulatory state, agency leaders face a fundamental choice:
should they “consume” or should they “invest?” “Consume” means
launching high profile cases and rule-making. “Invest” means developing
and nurturing the necessary infrastructure for the agency to handle whatever
the future may bring. The former brings headlines, while the latter will be
completely ignored. Unsurprisingly, consumption is routinely prioritized,
and investment is deferred, downgraded, or overlooked entirely. This essay
outlines the incentives for agency leadership to behave in this way and
explores the resulting agency costs (pun intended). The U.S. Federal Trade
Commission’s health care portfolio provides a useful case study of how one
agency managed and minimized these costs. Our essay concludes with
several proposals that should help encourage agency leadership to strike a
better
balance
between
consumption
and
investment.

1

Kovacic is Global Competition Professor of Law and Policy, George Washington
University Law School and Non-executive Director, United Kingdom Competition and
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Consume or Invest:
What Do/Should Agency Leaders Maximize?
“[P]art of public service is planting trees under whose shade you’ll
never sit.”2
I. Introduction
In the management cliché hall of fame, the all-time winner is “pick
the low-hanging fruit.”3 Of course, obtaining high-value results with a
minimum of effort is excellent advice, at least as a starting point. But, as a
general principle, the message is extremely short-sighted. Unless leaders
plant trees, there will be neither shade nor fruit for future generations to
enjoy.
The conflict between picking and planting – between consuming and
investing – is a policy perennial. Good leaders know that any success they
may achieve depends on the investment decisions made by their
predecessors. In like fashion, good leaders also know that the benefits of
any investment they make will be captured by their successors.
Agency leaders are not angels.4 They are human beings, who desire
personal recognition and advancement.
Investment in institutional
capability and capacity does not result in newspaper headlines, popular
acclaim, or the offer of a high paying private-sector job. Instead, it is the
announcement of a “big” case or rulemaking that casts the agency and
agency leadership in a positive light.
If there is no turnover in agency leadership, this dynamic would not
create a major problem: “when agency leadership does not change, the
leaders capture the benefits (and bear the costs) of the outcomes in the cases
2

Hillary Clinton Transcript, Building The ‘Growth and Fairness’ Economy, WALL ST.
J., July 13, 2015, at http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2015/07/13/hillary-clinton-transcriptbuilding-the-growth-and-fairness-economy/.
3
Lucy Kinder, Office jargon: The worst culprits in management speak, THE (UK)
TELEGRAPH,
Nov.
27,
2015,
available
at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/jobs/10393668/Office-jargon-The-worst-culprits-inmanagement-speak.html.
4
See The Federalist No. 51 (“If men were angels, no government would be necessary.
If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would
be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the
great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed;
and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the
primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of
auxiliary precautions.”)
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that they initiate.”5 But, agency leadership is never indefinite. Indeed, in
most of the administrative state, political appointees come and go quite
frequently.6 A timely departure makes it possible for agency leadership to
“‘outrun their mistakes,’ so that when blame-time arrives, the burden will
fall on someone else.”7 In practice, this means that agency leaders have a
significant incentive to launch big cases or rulemaking without being overly
concerned about the agency’s capability and capacity to deliver the goods.8
Stated more concretely, agency leaders will predictably and systematically
slight investment and prioritize consumption. I.B.G.-Y.B.G. (“I’ll be gone,
you’ll be gone”) doesn’t apply only to Wall Street.9
5

David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Can’t Anyone Here Play This Game?
Judging the FTC’s Critics, GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming, 2015) (hereinafter Can’t
Anyone Here Play This Game?).
6
PETER H. SCHUCK, WHY GOVERNMENT FAILS SO OFTEN AND HOW IT CAN DO
BETTER 316-317 (2014) (“A study of presidential appointees. . . found an overall median
tenure of only 2.5 years; one quarter of them served more than 3.6 years while another
quarter served for less than eighteen months.”)
7
Id., quoting ROBERT JACKALL, MORAL MAZES: THE WORLD OF CORPORATE
MANAGERS 90 (1988). Anthony King and Ivor Crewe study the behavior of cabinet
ministers and other senior officials in the United Kingdom, and reach the same conclusion:
“[t]he sheer passage of time may also result in non-accountability. By the time the
Thatcher government’s exciting new personal pensions had been mis-sold on a vast scale,
the relevant ministers and probably most of their senior officials had long since passed on.
It would have been almost impossible to hold any of them to account. . . the relationship in
British politics between, on the one hand, long-term success and failure and, on the other,
personal triumph and disgrace is all but non-existent. Most blunderers, however gross their
blunders, go unpunished.” ANTHONY KING & IVOR CREWE, THE BLUNDERS OF OUR
GOVERNMENTS 354, 359 (2014).
8
Timothy J. Muris, Principles for a Successful Competition Agency, 72 U. CHI. L. REV.
165, 166 (2005) (“An agency head garners great attention by beginning ‘bold’ initiatives
and suing big companies. When the bill comes due for the hard work of turning initiatives
into successful regulation and proving big cases in court, these agency heads are often gone
from the public stage. Their successors are left either to trim excessive proposals or even
to default, with possible damage to agency reputation. The departed agency heads, if
anyone in the Washington establishment now cares about their views, can always blame
failure on faulty implementation by their successors.”).
9
Eric Dash, What’s Really Wrong with Wall Street Pay, N.Y. TIMES ECONOMIX BLOG,
Sep. 18, 2009, at http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/09/18/whats-really-wrong-withwall-street-pay/?_r=0 (“A major cause of the current crisis will most likely prove to be a
mismatch of incentives for Wall Street traders. If a mortgage trader made a big bet, he had
the chance to land a big bonus if it paid off (and his boss did, too). If, however, that bet
didn’t pan out — and the trader lost a lot of money for the firm — he might receive no
bonus at all. On the contrary, he might get a princely severance package.
But one thing seems pretty clear: That trader would not receive a “negative bonus.” In
other words, he did not personally incur the cost of the trading blowup. Indeed, the open
secret on Wall Street was that traders did not risk losing their own money — just the
chance of receiving an enormous payout.
Economists call this a moral hazard problem. In bankerspeak, it’s known as the
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Building on our previous work,10 we show the importance of
balancing consumption against investment. We focus on the policy
mismatches that arise when short-term political appointees lead
governmental agencies with long-term policy needs – but our analysis also
applies to private and non-profit firms. We also discuss measures that can
serve to counteract inadequate attention to investment. We use the health
care program of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) since the mid-1970s
to illustrate the importance of sustained investments in capability.
Part II describes how investments in agency capability provide the
necessary foundation on which an agency builds successful cases, rules, and
other policy initiatives. Part III examines the structural and political
incentives that encourage agency leadership to systematically privilege
consumption over investment. Part IV provides a case study of the FTC’s
health care portfolio, where investments in policy R&D have played a
critical role in generating policy success. Part V identifies a few modest
strategies that might encourage the prioritization of investment by agency
leaders. Part VI addresses objections that might be raised against a
rebalancing of consumption and investment. Part VII concludes.
II.

The Need for Investment

In this essay, we focus on agencies similar to the FTC, but the
framework we describe applies to many governmental agencies.
Regulatory agencies, like the FTC, have a wide variety of policy
“I.B.G.-Y.B.G.” issue — as in “I’ll Be Gone and You’ll Be Gone” if the trade goes
south.”)
The same dynamic has been noted in international development projects: “[w]hen
those who design development projects and get them approved by relevant authorities,
move on, get promoted, and are not held accountable for results, is that not a case of you'll
be gone and I'll be gone? If you are not going to be held accountable for implementation
and results you don't have to worry about whether or not the project will produce results
under real world conditions. You can cut and paste global best practice on a technical issue
into projects to be implemented in vastly different environments. Job done. When
implementation challenges inevitably arise and hold things up, well, that is somebody else's
problem. For the design team it is a case of 'I'll be gone and you'll be gone.” Sina
Odugbemi, I’ll Be Gone and You’ll Be Gone, World Bank Blog, Sep. 23, 2009, at
http://blogs.worldbank.org/publicsphere/ill-be-gone-and-youll-be-gone.
10
Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 5; David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Why
Who Does What Matters: Governmental Design and Agency Performance, 82 GEO WASH.
L. REV. 1446 (2014) (hereinafter Agency Performance); David A. Hyman & William, E.
Kovacic, Competition Agencies with Complex Policy Portfolios: Divide or Conquer?
CONCURRENCES, No. 1-2013, at 9 (hereinafter Divide or Conquer); David A. Hyman &
William E. Kovacic, Institutional Design, Agency Life Cycle, and the Goals of Competition
Law, 81 FORD. L. REV. 2163 (2013); William E. Kovacic & David A. Hyman, Competition
Agency Design: What’s on the Menu? 8 EUR. COMP. J. 527 (2012).
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instruments at their disposal.11 An agency can prosecute cases, promulgate
rules, conduct studies, issue reports, convene public consultations, issue
guidelines, or have agency personnel give speeches. To apply these tools
effectively, the agency must do three things well: it must understand the
behavior it observes; it must decide whether the behavior is sufficiently
problematic to justify intervention; and, it must then choose among the
various alternative solutions. The expert performance of these three tasks –
requires substantial institutional capability and capacity. Developing that
capability and capacity requires an agency to perform effectively in five
distinct investment domains.12
The first investment domain requires the agency to hire skilled
professionals and other personnel, and organize them into teams. These
teams can be organized in a variety of ways. For example, the FTC has
separate Bureaus for Competition, Consumer Protection, and Economics.
The Bureau of Competition and the Bureau of Consumer Protection are
staffed by lawyers; the Bureau of Economics is staffed by economists.13 As
we have noted elsewhere, “the government is already thickly planted with
bureaus, agencies, and inter-agency working groups, departments and
commissions” – and each has its own internal organization designed to
effectuate the statutory mission.14
Whatever organizational configuration is chosen, a successful
operating unit will contain teams with strong analytical skills and deep
expertise in the relevant subject matter.15 Good teams prosper by reason of
their intellectual acumen and intuition, honed by repeated study of specific
11

For a discussion of how effective policy making often requires a wide range of
instruments, see More than Law Enforcement: The FTC’s Many Tools – A Conversation
with Tim Muris and Bob Pitofsky, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 773 (2005) (hereinafter
Muris/Pitofsky Conversation).
12
The importance of these factors is examined in Hyman & Kovacic, Agency
Performance, supra note 7, at 1474-75; William E. Kovacic, The Digital Broadband
Migration and the Federal Trade Commission: Building the Competition and Consumer
Protection Agency of the Future, 8 J. ON TELECOM. & HIGH TECH. 1, 7 (2010); see also
King & Crewe, supra note 7, at 382-84 (identifying “skills shortages” as important cause of
failure of government programs”).
13
See Hyman & Kovacic, Divide or Conquer, supra note 10. See also Luke Froeb,
Paul Pautler & Lars Hendrik Roeller, The Economics of Organizing Economists, 76
ANTITRUST L. J. 569 (2009) (describing the impact of the FTC relying on multidisciplinary teams of lawyers and economists v. having lawyers and economists organized
into separate bureaus).
14
Hyman & Kovacic, Agency Performance, supra note 10. See also Jennifer Nou,
Intra-Agency Coordination, 129 Harv. L. Rev. __ (forthcoming, 2015)
15
See William E. Kovacic, The Federal Trade Commission at 100: Into our 2nd
Century 46-49 (Jan. 2009) (importance of talented personnel to FTC performance),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/workshops/ftc100/docs/ftc100rpt.
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problems. For example, the FTC economists and lawyers who review
mergers in the pharmaceutical industry have analyzed dozens of
transactions over the past few decades.16 They have a sophisticated
understanding of individual firms, drug research pipelines, and industry
trends. The personnel on the groups changes over time, yet the FTC
pharmaceutical mergers team has sustained a good mix of experienced
managers and case handlers and newer employees who learn from
longstanding team members.
Second, the agency must develop an administrative infrastructure
(both personnel and physical facilities) to support substantive projects. A
major component of the FTC’s consumer protection work consists of
prosecuting fraudulent schemes involving health care products and
services.17 These and other anti-fraud initiatives have benefitted immensely
from investments the FTC made in the 1990s to build an electronic data
base (Consumer Sentinel) that collects and analyzes complaints about
alleged misconduct.18 By amassing complaints received by the FTC and a
variety of governmental and non-governmental partners, Consumer Sentinel
enables the FTC’s consumer protection specialists to identify fraudulent
scams quickly and assemble the evidence necessary to initiate litigation.19
Thus, the investment in Consumer Sentinel made it much easier for the FTC
to detect and remedy serious fraud on a real-time basis.20
The FTC has made similar investments in mobile telephony.21
16

Markus H. Meier, Bradley S. Albert & Saralisa Brau, Overview of FTC Antitrust
Actions in Pharmaceutical Services and Products 26-64 (discussing FTC pharmaceutical
mergers program), available at http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/competitionpolicy-guidance/rxupdate.pdf.
17
See, e.g., FTC Press Release, FTC, All 50 States and D.C. Charge Four Cancer
Charities With Bilking Over $187 Million from Consumers (May 19, 2015), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/05/ftc-all-50-states-dc-charge-fourcancer-charities-bilking-over; FTC Press Release, No Silver Lining for Marketers of Bogus
Supplement; Federal Agencies Crack Down on Health Fraud (June 19, 2003), available at
http://ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2003/06/no-silver-lining-marketers-bogussupplement-federal-agencies; FTC Press Release, Company Touting Unproven Cancer
Treatment Agrees to Settle FTC Charges (July 24, 2002), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2002/07/company-touting-unproven-cancertreatment-agrees-settle-ftc.
18
See Muris/Pitofsky Conversation, supra note 11, at 789-91 (discussing creation and
operation of Consumer Sentinel).
19
FTC, Consumer Sentinel Network (describing functions of Consumer Sentinel
Network), available at http://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/consumer-sentinel-network.
20
See Muris/Pitofsky Conversation, supra note 11, at 796-97 (describing impact of
Consumer Sentinel).
21
On the FTC’s programs in this area, see FTC, Staff Report, Paper, Plastic … or
Mobile? An FTC Workshop on Mobile Payments (Mar. 2013), available at
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Communications technology is one of the most dynamic areas of
commerce, and the FTC has to continuously invest in order to keep up. In
response, the FTC has hired technologists with expertise in the relevant
technical disciplines and established an internal “mobile laboratory” to
detect fraud in the use of mobile telephones.22
A third key ingredient of agency capability is the depth and currency
of its knowledge about the sectors and practices that are subject to the
agency’s scrutiny. As suggested above, one element of this knowledge base
is the accumulated experience of agency analysts in dealing with specific
industries and commercial practices. Another important source of an
agency’s knowledge consists of investments that are the public policy
equivalent of the research and development expenditures that a private
company makes to create new or improve existing products.23
Policy R&D24 can take various forms, including empirical studies of
individual sectors or commercial phenomena, legal research concerning the
legal predicates for future cases, hearings and public consultations, and
retrospective assessments of completed agency initiatives.25 These measures
have a common purpose – to improve the agency’s ability to identify areas
of needed intervention; devise useful remedies; and give advice to
legislators and other government agencies. The urgency to make these
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/paper-plastic-or-mobile-ftc-workshop-mobile-payments; FTC,
Staff Report, Mobile Privacy Disclosures – Building Trust Through Transparency (Feb.
2013), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/mobileprivacu-disclosures-building-trust-through-transparency-federal-trade-commission-staffreport/130201mobileprivacyreport.pdf.
22
See FTC, Division of Litigation, Technology & Analysis (describing FTC’s
Mobile/Internet Lab), available at http://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/bureaus-offices/bureauconsumer-protection/our-divisions/division-litigation-technology; Joel Schectman, Q&A
David Vladeck, Former Director of FTC Consumer Unit, Risk & Compliance Journal,
Wall St. J., Jan, 22, 2014 (“[W]e did not have the technologists on staff at the time and to
do highly technical cases of the kind we did during my [Vladeck’s] tenure, and doing still
today, you need substantial forensic work. One of the things we did was bring in
technologists to have on staff. We set up a laboratory to do forensic work on mobile
devices. You need to have people who can view evidence captures on mobile devices and
really understand the ecosystem behind the screen. I think we were the first civil law
enforcement agency anywhere that had a fully functioning lab for mobile devices.”).
23
Kovacic, supra note 15, at 91-109 (describing FTC investments that increase the
agency’s knowledge base).
24
This phrase originated in Timothy J. Muris, Looking Forward: The Federal Trade
Commission and the Future Development of U.S. Competition Policy, 2003 COLUMBIA BUS.
L. REV. 359.
25
See Muris/Pitofsky Dialogue, supra note 11, at 774-76 (discussing FTC policy R&D
tools); William E. Kovacic, Measuring What Matters: The Federal Trade Commission and
Investments in Competition Policy Research and Development, 72 Antitrust L.J. 861 (2005)
(same); Kovacic, supra note 15, at 91-109 (same).
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investments is especially great in sectors, such as health care, that feature
high levels of technological and organizational dynamism.26 Congress gave
the FTC a diverse portfolio of policy R&D tools,27 and their application has
figured prominently in the agency’s health care programs.
A fourth form of investment that fosters program success is the
development of internal procedures that enable the agency to make
intelligent decisions about how to deploy its limited resources There are
many ways that an agency can structure its internal decision making
process.28 Good agency practice includes continuing efforts to improve
these processes to test evidence rigorously and to counteract behavioral
phenomena, such as confirmation bias, that might otherwise cause the
agency to slight theories or facts that dictate a reassessment of its views.29
Finally, an agency must “play well with others.” In many fields of
regulation, policy making duties are shared by a multiplicity of public
bodies within individual jurisdictions and across nations.30 In a world of
increasing policymaking multiplicity and fragmentation, the attainment of
good regulatory solutions requires interagency and inter-jurisdictional
engagement. Some forms of engagement take place through formal
mechanisms such as memoranda of understanding between two or more
agencies, or a network that brings together multiple agencies within a single
jurisdiction or across jurisdictions.31 Others can be highly informal, such as
a custom of senior managers or case handlers from different agencies
meeting regularly to discuss matters of common concern. These formal and
informal means of coordination and cooperation do not happen without
investment – although investment does not guarantee that other agencies
26

William E. Kovacic, Antitrust in High-Tech Industries: Improving the Federal
Antitrust Joint Venture, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1102-03 (2012).
27
Foremost among these are provisions that authorize the FTC to collect information
on industrial conditions and specific practices outside the context of law enforcement and
to publish studies. 15 U.S.C. ¶¶ 46, 49. Their significance is discussed in William E.
Kovacic, The Federal Trade Commission as Convenor: Developing Regulatory Policy
without Litigation or Rulemaking, 13 COLO. TECH. L.J. 17, 19 (2015).
28
See William E. Kovacic et al., Merger Control Procedures and Institutions: A
Comparison of EU and US Practice, 59 Antitrust Bull. 55 (2014) (comparing European
Union and U.S. merger control processes).
29
James C. Cooper & William E. Kovacic, Behavioral Economics and Regulatory
Agency Decisionmaking, 41 J. Reg. Econ. 41 (2011).
30
Hyman & Kovacic, Agency Performance, supra note 10, at 1480-81.
31
See Hugh M. Hollman & William E. Kovacic, The International Competition
Network: Its Past, Current, and Future Role, 20 MINN. J. INT’L L. 274 (2011) (describing
development of formal networks that bring together competition agency officials to discuss
matters of common concern); Muris/Pitofsky Conversation, supra note 11, at 795
(describing FTC agreements with foreign governments to cooperate on consumer
protection matters)
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will decide to make nice.32
An agency that does all of these things increases the chances of
attaining policy success. The requisite investments will seldom happen by
accident. Rather, each generation of agency leadership must make a
commitment to build institutional capability and capacity, and continuously
examine whether it is investing enough, and in the right things. As we
discuss more fully below, these investments are the foundation on which
good outcomes depend.
III.

The Sirens of Consumption

If investment is so important, why do we think that agency
leadership routinely defers, downgrades, or overlooks it?33 The explanation
is simple: the Sirens of consumption are hard to resist.34 What agency
leader can resist the temptation of being the one to announce an attentiongrabbing intervention, such as the initiation of a case against a major
industry player, or the launch of a new rule-making project? The resulting
press conference and favorable academic commentary provide ready-made
opportunities for credit-claiming. Professional reputations and post-public
service employment opportunities will rise or fall depending on the volume
of an agency’s activity.35 Simply stated, the initiation of cases and rule32

There have been periodic bitter disputes between the FTC and DOJ over
“clearance” (i.e., which agency should handle certain types of cases; the substantive
content of a report on Section 2 of the Sherman Act; and the DOJ’s recommendation
against the granting of certiorari in Schering-Plough, an early FTC reverse payment case.
One of us (Kovacic) ruefully noted in an interview that despite continuous investment, “we
have an archipelago of policy-makers, with very inadequate ferry service between the
islands. . . In too many instances, when you go to visit those islands, the inhabitants come
out with sticks and torches and try to chase you away.” Jonathan B. Baker, Turning on
Itself,
THE
NEW
REPUBLIC,
Sep.
14,
2008,
at
https://newrepublic.com/article/63428/turning-itself.
33
See Kovacic, supra note 12, at 7; Muris, supra note 8.
34
William E. Kovacic, Rating the Competition Agencies: What Constitutes Good
Performance? 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 903, 923 (2009) (“The perceived imperative to
create new cases can create a serious mismatch between commitments and capabilities, as
the sirens of credit claiming beckon today’s manager to overlook the costs that improvident
case selection might impose on the agency in the future, well after the incumbent manager
has departed.”)
35
Consumption increases post-public service employment opportunities in two ways.
First, consumption enhances reputation directly. And, those responsible for creating a
regulatory labyrinth are ideally situated to guide affected firms through the maze – and be
handsomely compensated for doing so. In nautical terms, having created underwater
obstacles at the entry to the harbor, the former regulator then acts as the pilot who can bring
ships safely to shore. See Hyman & Kovacic, Can’t Anyone Here Play This Game?, supra
note 5 (discussing private sector demand for former regulators who played a role in
creating regulatory mechanisms).
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making projects are the readily observable events by which agency
leadership is typically judged.36
Worse still, the temporal disconnect between launches and
(sometimes crash) landings means that agency leadership does not bear the
full cost of launching cases and rule-making that should never have been
initiated. The same dynamic applies to cases and rule-making that should
have been initiated, but failed because there was insufficient capability and
capacity to handle the matter in question. Indeed, agency leadership may
not bear any of the costs, if they are able to blame their successors for the
(usually unspecified) mistakes that supposedly caused a bad outcome. 37
Politics can also encourage excessive and unwise consumption.
When the price of gasoline rose sharply in the early-1970s, Congress
demanded that the FTC take action to protect independent refiners from
alleged overreaching by large, vertically integrated petroleum companies.38
The FTC responded in 1973 by filing In re Exxon, a “shared
monopolization” case seeking the vertical disintegration of the eight largest
petroleum refiners in the United States.39 The sprawling case was
unmanageable from the start, and it fast became seen by FTC staff as a
professional chain gang where morale and careers went to die.40 In 1981,
36

Kovacic, supra note 12, at 10-11. See also William E. Kovacic, The Modern
Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy Norms, 71 ANTITRUST L. J. 377, 404-05, 408-10
(2004) (describing and criticizing tendency of commentators to use prosecution of cases as
main measure of competition agency quality); King & Crewe, supra note 7, at 333-45
(noting “hyperactivism” of ministers in U.K.). Unsurprisingly, the preeminent annual
ranking of competition agencies focuses chiefly on the prosecution of cases. Global
Competition Review, 2015 Rating Enforcement – The Annual Ranking of the World’s
Leading Competition Authorities (2015).
37
William E. Kovacic, Federal Antitrust Enforcement in the Reagan Administration:
Two Cheers for the Disappearance of the Large Firm Defendant in Nonmerger Cases, 12
RES. L. & ECON. 173, 189 (1989) (“[A] short-term perspective may incline the manager to
launch headline-grabbing initiatives with inadequate regard for the matter’s underlying
merits or the ultimate cost to the agency, in resources and reputation, in litigating the case.
If the case goes badly, the manager responsible for the take-off rarely is held to account for
the crash landing. He can hope the passage of time will dim memories of his involvement,
he can blame intervening agents for their poor execution of his good idea, or he can shrug
his shoulders and say he was making the best of the fundamentally bad situation that
policymakers encounter in the nation’s capital.”) See also Muris, supra note 8.
38
William E. Kovacic, The Federal Trade Commission and Congressional Oversight
of Antitrust Enforcement, 17 TULSA L. REV. 587, 637-39 (1982).
39
In re Exxon Corp., [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 20,388
(Dkt. No. 8934, July 17, 1973), complaint dismissed, 98 F.T.C. 453 (1981). The run-up to
the case and the political pressure that inspired it are examined in Timothy J. Muris & Bilal
K. Sayyed, The Long Shadow of Standard Oil: Policy, Petroleum and Politics at the
Federal Trade Commission, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 843, 859-64 (2011).
40
Edward Cowan, Attorneys Quit F.T.C. Oil Case, N.Y. Times, June 26, 1978, at D-1.

19-Dec-15]

What Do/Should Agency Leaders Maximize?

11

after eight years of pre-trial discovery, the Commission dismissed the
case.41 The case consumed massive resources and inflicted lasting harm on
the FTC’s reputation.42
The same pattern recurred thirty years later, albeit with a different
outcome. The price of gasoline spiked repeatedly during 2000-2008, and
members of Congress used a variety of techniques to induce the FTC to take
action.43 In one instance, two members of the Senate imposed a “hold” on
the nomination of Deborah Majoras to be the agency’s chair.44 The hold
was released only after the Commission in May 2004 opened an
investigation to study the decision of Chevron to close a refinery in
Bakersfield, California.45
Congress held multiple hearings, during which legislators berated
agency leaders for allowing gasoline prices to rise. Perhaps the most
striking of these legislative show trials was the appearance of Chairman
Majoras in May, 2006 before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science
& Transportation to defend an FTC report on the impact of Hurricane
Katrina and Hurricane Rita on petroleum product prices.46 The report found
no evidence of supplier collusion, and instead concluded that the observed
price spikes were the inevitable result of national disasters that severely
disrupted refining and transport operations. Despite demagogic and
frequently ad hominem interrogation, Majoras held firm. She refused to
commit the agency to use its antitrust law enforcement powers in a futile,
expensive attempt to tame forces entirely beyond the agency’s control.
To be sure, the problem is not unique to gasoline. Elected officials
routinely demand that regulators “do something” when the price of heating
41

Exxon Corp., 98 F.T.C. 453, 459 (1981).
William E. Kovacic, Standard Oil Co. v. United States and Its Influence on the
Conception of Competition Policy, 2012 COMP. L.J. 89 (discussing FTC’s prosecution of
petroleum industry shared monopolization case and its long-term effects on the agency).
Kovacic spent two years working on the Exxon case, and saw first-hand the corrosive
effects of requiring staff to work on a matter that all involved knew to be doomed.
43
This episode is recounted in Muris & Sayyed, supra note 39, at 903-07.
44
One of us (Kovacic) was the FTC’s General Counsel at this time and observed the
congressional moves to delay consideration of the Majoras nomination.
45
The opening and closing of the FTC inquiry are described in FTC Press Release,
FTC Closes its Investigation of Shell Oils Decision to Close Bakersfield, California,
Refinery (May 25, 2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2015/05/ftc-closes-its-investigation-shell-oils-decision-close.
46
Federal Trade Commission Investigation of Gasoline Price Manipulation and PostKatrina Price Gasoline Increases: A Commission Report to Congress (May 22, 2006),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-tradecommission-investigation-gasoline-price-manipulation-and-post-katreina-gasolineprice/060518publicgasolinepriceinvestigationreportfinal.pdf.
42
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oil, natural gas, electricity, and other important consumer products rises
dramatically. Rather than attribute a price increase to causes beyond the
control of the product’s suppliers, such as a sudden boost in input costs,
elected officials typically insist that wrongful supplier behavior (e.g.,
collusion, fraud, price-gouging) accounts for the unwanted event. In these
circumstances, the regulator will face intense pressure to use its powers to
address the problem. Intervention (in the form of an investigation or case)
is faster and easier than attempting to educate legislators and cabinet
officials that the root cause of the market shock lies elsewhere – and the
intervention may actually be counter-productive.47 Indeed, the failure to
intervene may be viewed by members of Congress as dereliction of duty.
Caving in to the pressure to intervene will provide momentary relief to
agency leadership, but at a significant long-term institutional cost. Filing
the Exxon case got Congress off of the FTC’s back, but it inflicted painful
long-term harm. And, by the time the bill comes due, those who were
responsible for the initial decision to intervene will be long gone – and will
find it easy to blame their successors if anyone bothers to ask.48
A third factor encouraging consumption is a miscalculation of the
likely difficulty, costs, and risks of the contemplated intervention. The
decision to launch a case should rest upon a clear-headed understanding of
how hard it will be to gather relevant evidence; the legal foundations of the
case; the type and quality of personnel required for effective
implementation; and the risks to the agency of proceeding. Each of these
should be evaluated within the context of the agency’s overall portfolio of
existing commitments. If an agency does not undertake this analysis,
leadership will tend to initiate matters without a realistic view of what it
47

Price-gouging legislation provides a particularly clear example. See Michael A.
Sallinger, Give Your Cabdriver a Fat Tip!, Wall St. J. June 24, 2006, at
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB115110485824489519. (“If the public were to ask my
advice on the wisdom of price gouging legislation, however, I would counsel against it.
When disasters like Katrina and Rita occur, prices must go up. The difficulty is that
without knowing the details of a disaster, it is impossible to specify in advance how much
prices need to rise. As result, price-gouging legislation -- particularly if penalties are
severe and enforcement is aggressive -- will pose two distinct risks. One is that prices will
not rise to market-clearing levels and gas stations will run out of gasoline. As unpleasant
as high-priced gasoline is, running out will be even worse. The other is that gas stations
will shut down rather than risk an allegation of price gouging.”) See also Steven Mufson,
Congress Tells FTC to Define Price Gouging, Wash. Post, May 6, 2006 (“‘Many
economists cringe when they hear politicians talk about price gouging,’ said N. Gregory
Mankiw, an economics professor at Harvard University and former chairman of President
Bush's Council of Economic Advisers. ‘To economists, the price system is central to how
market economies allocate resources. Sometimes prices need to rise to balance supply and
demand, even if that outcome is politically unpopular.’”)
48
See supra note 37.
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will take to complete them successfully.
The IBM case provides a striking example of the problem. The case
was launched by the Department of Justice (DOJ), on the final day of
Lyndon Johnson’s presidency in January 1969.49 Among other relief, DOJ
sought to break IBM into four or more computer companies.50 It quickly
became apparent that the case was in trouble.51 DOJ had vastly
underestimated the doctrinal, evidentiary, and administrative difficulties of
seeking to take apart what was, perhaps, the paramount exemplar of
American technological progress in the post-World War II era.52 Nor did
DOJ anticipate the scope and ferocity of defense that IBM and its external
advisors would mount to oppose the government. IBM’s ensemble of
exceptional trial lawyers and expert economists overwhelmed a DOJ
prosecution team afflicted with disorganization and rapid turnover in
personnel.53 In 1982 DOJ abandoned the case,54 whose duration had
“spanned the terms of five Presidents, nine Attorney Generals, and seven
Assistant Attorney Generals.”55 The trial consumed 700 calendar days,
generated a transcript of over 104,000 pages, and featured 17,000 exhibits.56
In Robert Bork’s phrase, the IBM case was “the Antitrust Division’s
49

United States v. IBM Corp., [1961-1970 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶
45,069 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 1969) (complaint alleging monopolization and attempted
monopolization).
50
See FRANK FISHER ET AL., FOLDED, SPINDLED, AND MUTILATED – ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS AND U.S. V. IBM 353-68 (1983) (reprinting DOJ’s original complaint and
amended complaint against IBM).
51
Donald Baker, who served as DOJ’s Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust from
1976 to 1977, wrote that “[b]y even the mid-1970s, it was clear that the [IBM] case was a
relic.” Donald Baker, Government Enforcement of Section Two, 61 Notre Dame L. Rev.
898, 8190 (1986) (hereinafter Section Two)
52
The history of the IBM case and DOJ’s missteps in the formulation and litigation of
the matter are recounted in John E. Lopatka, United States v. IBM: A Monument to
Arrogance, 68 Antitrust L.J. 145 (2000). We also based the statements in this paragraph on
interviews that Kovacic conducted with Edwin Zimmerman, a senior official at DOJ at the
time of the filing of the IBM case, and Frederic M. Scherer, who served as DOJ’s chief
economic expert on the case.
53
IBM’s successful defense against the DOJ case is reviewed in JAMES STEWART, THE
PARTNERS 53-113 (1983). Among the stars of the IBM defense team was David Boies, a
young partner at Cravath, Swaine & Moore. Years later Boies headed the litigation trial
team in DOJ’s successful prosecution in the late 1990s of Microsoft for illegal
monopolization of the market for computer operating systems.
54
In re International Business Machs. Corp., 687 F.2d 591, 593 (2d Cir. 1982)
(ordering the issue of a writ of mandamus directing district court to dismiss complaint in
accordance with stipulation of the parties).
55
Baker, Section Two, supra note 51, at 899 n. 13.
56
Post-Mortem on IBM Case Provides Forum for Conflicting Perspectives, 42
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 310-11 (1982).
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Vietnam.”57 These examples make it clear that an agency’s failure to think
carefully in advance about its capability to deliver on a single major case
can be devastating.
What happens when agency leadership ignores these points, and
chases the Sirens of consumption? The FTC in the 1970s provides a clear
case study of what can go wrong. As we noted in an earlier article, “it is one
thing to launch a single bet-the-agency case and entirely another to launch a
half-dozen of those cases and an equal number of significant rulemaking
projects simultaneously—let alone staff each case and rulemaking project
so as to maximize the likelihood of good outcomes across the entire
portfolio.”58
Despite the obvious risks, that is more or less what the FTC did in
the 1970s. Consider a partial list of the agency’s competition matters
during this period:
•

Shared monopolization cases involving the country’s eight leading
petroleum refiners (the Exxon case)59 and the four leading producers
of ready-to-eat breakfast cereals;60

•

Cases alleging monopolization or attempted monopolization based
on predatory pricing against leading producers in the bread, coffee,
and reconstituted lemon juice sectors;61

•

A challenge to the long-standing practice of the nation’s leading
soft-drink bottlers for using exclusive territories to distribute their
products;62

•

A case alleging attempting monopolization in the chemicals sector
by means of strategic announcements of capacity expansion;63

57

This quotation appears in Baker, Section Two, supra note 51, at 899 n.13.
Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 5
59
Exxon Corp., 98 F.T.C at 456-59 (complaint alleging agreement to monopolize and
maintenance of a noncompetitive3 market structure).
60
Kellogg Corp., 99 F.T.C. 8, 11-16 (1982) (complaint alleging maintenance of a
highly concentrated, noncompetitive market structure and shared monopolization)..
61
International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 104 F.T.C. 280, 284-85 (1984) (complaint alleging
attempted monopolization in the bread sector); General Foods Corp., 103 F.T.C. 204, 20608 (1984) (complaint alleging attempted monopolization in production and sale of instant
coffee); Borden, Inc., 92 F.T.C 669, 671-72 (1978) (complaint alleging monopolization and
maintenance of a noncompetitive market structure in production and sale of reconstituted
lemon juice), enforcement granted, 674 F.2d 498, 517 (6th Cir. 1982), modified, 102 F.T.C.
1147 (1983).
62
Coca-Cola Co., 91 F.T.C. 517 (1978), remanded for dismissal, 642 F2d. 1387 (D.C.
Cir. 1981).
63
E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 96 F.T.C. 653, 654-55 (1980) (complaint alleging
58
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•

A case alleging monopolization and attempted monopolization
against the world’s leading producer of plain-paper photocopiers;64

•

A case challenging illegal monopolization and attempting
monopolization against one of the largest U.S. producers of citrus
fruit;65

•

A case attacking the American Medical Association for imposing
restrictions on advertising and marketing in the medical
profession;66

•

A case designed to lead to the repudiation of the rule of United
States v. Colgate which gave manufacturers protection from antitrust
liability when unilaterally imposing resale price maintenance upon
downstream firms;67

•

Two cases challenging the parallel, non-collusive adoption of
facilitating practices by rival producers;68

•

A case challenging alleged discrimination by the publisher of airline
timetables in its presentation of flight information.69

The over-extension of the FTC’s 1970s antitrust program was matched
by an even more astonishing agenda of consumer protection rule-making
proceedings.70 Among other matters, the FTC “proposed rules that would
have: imposed disclosures on over-the- counter medicines; required
inspections, disclosures and warranties on used cars; established definitions
(like ‘natural’) for foods; regulated mobile home warranties; and banned

atte3mpted monopolization).
64
Xerox Corp., 86 F.T.C. 364, 367-68 (1975) (complaint alleging monopolization,
attempted monopolization, and maintenance of a highly concentrated market structure).
65
Sunkist Growers, Inc., 97 F.T.C. 443, 445-49 (1981) (complaint alle3ging
monopolization, attempted monopolization, and maintenance of a noncompetitive market
structure).
66
American Medical Ass’n, 94 F.T.C. 701 (1979), aff’d in part, modified in part, 638
F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980), aff’d by an equally divided Supreme Court, 455 U.S. 676 (1982).
67
Russell Stover Candies, Inc., 100 F.T.C. 1 (1982), enforcement denied, 718 F.2d
256 (8th Cir. 1983).
68
Boise Cascade, 91 F.T.C. 1 (1978), enforcement denied, 637 F.2d 573 (9th Cir.
1980); Ethyl Corp., 101 F.T.C. 425 (1983), enforcement denied, 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir.
1984)
69
Reuben H. Donnelley Corp., 95 F.T.C. 1 (1976), enforcement denied, 630 F.2d 920
(2d Cir. 1980).
70
On the FTC’s consumer protection rulemaking agenda in the 1970s, see William
MacLeod et al., Three Rules and a Constitution: Consumer Protection Finds Its Limits in
Competition Policy, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 943, 951-54 (2005).
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certain credit practices. . .”71 There were almost thirty major rule-making
projects in progress during this period – and the then-FTC Chairman
(Michael Pertschuk) had announced that going forward, rule-making might
be based on public policy grounds, including to “prohibit businesses from
hiring illegal aliens, to prevent companies from cheating on taxes, and to
require companies with repeated environmental violations to place an
environmental on their Boards.”72 Pertschuk subsequently acknowledged
that he had presided over a rule-making “frenzy.”73
Even if one boldly assumes that each ambitious decision by the FTC
to undertake each of these matters, when seen in isolation, made good
substantive sense, the full collection completely overwhelmed the FTC’s
institutional capacity to deliver. To add new, difficult initiatives to an
already crowded agenda without accounting for implementation burdens
was a breathtaking example of administrative malpractice.74
In fairness, the fault for overextension sometimes lies with
legislators, who assign new duties to agencies without considering
capability and capacity. These new responsibilities only rarely come with
additional resources attached. As we have explained in other work, the
agency then faces the choice of either ignoring selected responsibilities or
spreading its resources thin in trying to do it all.75 The first strategy is a
form of regulatory disobedience, and the second is a formula for inevitable
failures in delivery.
In reciting the dangers of overextension, we are not suggesting that
agency leadership should forego consumption, and devote all of their efforts
to investment. Consumption, in the form of law enforcement and
rulemaking, is essential to the work of a good regulatory agency. The
willingness to litigate cases and the ability to pursue them to a successful
end are vital to an agency’s credibility, effectiveness, and legitimacy.
Litigated cases set the boundaries of lawful behavior. A regulator that
71

Id.
Id., citing Timothy J. Muris & J. Howard Beales, The Limits of Unfairness Under
the Federal Trade Commmission Act 14 Ass’n of Nat’l Advertisers (1991)
73
MICHAEL PERTSCHUK, REVOLT AGAINST REGULATION 54 (1982)
74
Kovacic, supra note 34, at 923 (“One could understand a decision to bring one
innovating and potentially path-breaking shared monopolization case, but it was
improvident to bring two. One could imagine a decision to bring one or two predatory
pricing cases, but it overtaxed the agency’s capacity to do three at once. To do four
significant dominance cases at one time might have been manageable. To do eight was
unwise. Incumbent leadership began new matters without asking difficult questions about
how the agency would bring them to a successful end.”) See also Kovacic, supra note 15.
75
Hyman & Kovacic, Agency Performance, supra note 10. Dodd-Frank placed the
new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau in precisely this unenviable position. Id.
72
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cannot credibly commit that it will challenge misconduct is quickly
recognized to be a paper tiger.76 Litigation also provides an indispensable
means for obtaining remedies for the victims of misconduct. Rulemaking is
similarly important as a means to correct problems that pervade entire
economic sectors, or appear in multiple areas of commerce. Finally,
establishing a reputation for courageously taking on hard problems can
build internal morale and attract high quality talent.
Simply stated, a sensible scorecard for agency performance must
consider not just whether cases or rulemaking are launched, but when and
how they land.77 The issue is not whether agency leadership aims at
ambitious targets, but is instead the “ability to match means to ends.”78 We
should harness the personal ambition and zeal of agency leadership in the
service of effective policy implementation.79
IV.

A Case Study of Balanced Investment and Consumption

The FTC’s health care portfolio shows the benefits of a balanced
approach to investment and consumption. Since the 1970s, the FTC has
devoted considerable effort to health care, beginning with a major case
challenging restrictions on advertising in the medical profession,80 and
going on from there.81 In health care, the FTC has batted through its entire
rotation of policy tools, including numerous cases, rule-making, advisory
opinions, hearings, and competition advocacy.82 More than any other
76

Of course, litigation does not require actually taking defendants to trial. As we
noted in an earlier article, “taking a case to trial and losing doesn’t help the agency’s brand
– and successful agencies don’t need to take their cases to trial to accomplish their
regulatory objectives.” Hyman & Kovacic, Agency Performance, supra note 10, at fn 139.
77
In some instances, the scorecard does include outcomes. When the website for
Obamacare (healthcare.gov) failed on launch, no amount of spinning could obscure the
problem. The continuing inability of the Veterans Administration to address its waiting
lists, other than by outright falsification of the data, provides another example of the
phenomenon.
78
King & Crewe, supra note 7, at 419.
79
Schuck, supra note 6, at 129 (“What matters, or should matter, to the citizenry is the
actual performance of officially administered programs on the ground, yet this performance
may have little or nothing to do with how publicly-spirited they are. Indeed, just as speed
is a bad thing if one is going in the wrong direction, so officials’ zeal may in some
situations actually exacerbate program failure.”)
80
American Medical Ass’n, 94 F.T.C. 701 (1979), modified and enforced, 638 F.2d
443 (2d Cir. 1980), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 455 U.S. 676 (1982).
81
John E. Kwoka, Jr., The Federal |Trade Commission and the Professions: A Quarter
Century of Accomplishment and Some New Challenges, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 997 (2005).
82
See Jonathan Nuechterlein, How the FTC Works: Lessons from the Commission’s
Supreme Court Trifecta 3-6 (Mar. 20, 2015) (describing FTC’s reliance on the full
portfolio of its policy tools in development its modern health care program), available at
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/632081/150320adminlawre
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program, the health care program has paid the rent for the FTC’s charter as
a competition authority.
Consider just a few recent accomplishments. Over the past three
years, the FTC has achieved victories in three Supreme Court cases
involving health care. In North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners,
the Supreme Court held that absent active supervision, antitrust scrutiny of
the actions of a state licensing board dominated by active market
participants was proper.83 In Phoebe Putney, the Court said that state action
immunity should be read narrowly, and reiterated the requirement that states
must clearly articulate their purpose to suppress competition.84 In Actavis,
the Court said the rule of reason applies to the “reverse payments” in the
pharmaceutical sector, and rejected a more permissive “scope of the patent”
test.85
All three victories were built on a foundation of decades of hard
work. These high-profile cases were part of a larger litigation program
that has seen the FTC successfully challenge hospital mergers (after more
than a decade of losses);87 dramatically reduce abuse of the Hatch-Waxman
Act;88 attack horizontal restraints involving health care providers;89 and
oppose overreaching forms of occupational licensing and other restrictions
on competition.90 In addition to these litigation programs, the FTC has
engaged in a large number of advocacy initiatives, encouraging other
86

view.pdf
83
North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC, 135 S, Ct, 1101 (2015).
84
FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health System, 133 S. Ct. 1003 (2013).
85
FTC v. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
86
Nuechterlein, supra note 82, at 1-2 (“I mention these victories not out of a misplaced
sense of triumphalism, but because each of the three cases tells a compelling back story
about what makes the FTC successful as a competition authority. Each of the three arose
from a multi-decade FTC initiative focusing on a difficult and discrete area of competition
policy. And each of those initiatives was built on a solid foundation of strong bipartisan
support and close coordination among the FTC’s litigators, economists, and policy
analysts.”)
87
Since 2000, the FTC’s merger enforcement program in the hospital sector has
achieved litigated victories in the courts of appeals in two cases (St. Alphonsus Ctr. –
Nampa, Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., 778 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2015) and ProMedica v.
FTC, 749 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 2014)), and has resulted in the abandonment of proposed
mergers in two others. In another case (Evanston Hospital) the FTC issued an opinion
finding that a consummated merger had violated Section 7 of the Clayton Act, though the
remedy ultimately achieved in the case is generally regarded as a disappointment. These
accomplishments are reviewed in Nuechterlein, supra note 82, at 6.
88
FTC v. Actavis, 133 S.Ct. 2223 (2013).
89
North Texas Specialty Physicians v. FTC, 528 F.3d 346 (5th Cir. 2008).
90
North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015); South
Carolina State Board of Dentistry v. FTC, 455 F.3d 436 (4th Cir. 2006).

19-Dec-15]

What Do/Should Agency Leaders Maximize?

19

government entities to account for the competitive impact of statutes and
regulations.91
These successes were not an accident, or the result of dumb luck.
Instead, the FTC: (a) identified health care as a major priority; (b) invested
substantial resources to build capability and capacity in the area; and (c)
conducted periodic ex post evaluations to identify areas of useful
refinement.92 We briefly address each of these steps below.
A. Setting Goals and Designing a Strategy to Achieve Them
Before the 1970s, the FTC was a reactive agency, responding to
consumer complaints, and trying to “clear the inbox.” During this period,
health care was not a major priority for the agency. Health care became a
priority because the FTC decided to engage in strategic planning. The
strategic planning process was driven by the FTC’s desire to identify areas
of the economy where it could make a useful and distinctive contribution,
thereby delivering major benefits to consumers. Strategic planning made it
clear that health care was a “target-rich” environment for the FTC.
Why did the FTC decide to engage in strategic planning, rather than
allow its workload and priorities to be driven by the inbox of consumer
complaints? The FTC adopted strategic planning because of external
pressure and internal changes. External commentators and legislators
demanded improvements, including enhancements in the FTC’s system for
setting priorities; a focus on difficult and unsettled areas of competition law;
and attention to problems that could be addressed with the FTC’s unique
array of policy making instruments.93 Legislators in the early 1970s also
identified the rising cost of medical services as a worthy subject for the
FTC’s attention.94 These demands established the framework within which
the FTC shaped its competition policy agenda.
91

On the FTC’s advocacy program, see Andrew I. Gavil & Tara Isa Koslov, A Flexible
Health Care Workforce Requires a Flexible Regulatory Environment: Promoting
Competition Through Regulatory Reform, 90 WASH L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2016);
Maureen K. Ohlhausen, 100 Is the New 30: Recommendations for the FTC’s Next 100
Years, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1131, 1134 (2014) (calling FTC’s competition advocacy
role a “tool of great importance”); James C. Cooper et al., Theory and Practice of
Competition Advocacy at the FTC, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 1091 (2005).
92
Nuechterlein, supra note 82, at 7 (in targeting health care, “the FTC identified a
competition policy problem, closely analyzed it over many years with all the investigatory
tools at its disposal, and brought a series of enforcement actions to protect consumers from
anticompetitive practices.”)
93
See Hyman & Kovacic, Can’t Anyone Here Play This Game? supra note 5
(discussing criticism of the FTC by the American Bar Association’s Commission to Study
the Federal Trade Commission, and by Congress).
94
Kovacic, supra note 38, at 639-40.
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The internal changes were less visible, but equally significant.
During the 1970s, the Commission recruited talented managers and
supporting personnel to spot potential high-value applications of the
agency’s competition powers. Internal analysis and research made it clear
that a greater dedication of resources to health care would significantly
improve consumer welfare.95 The combination of these elements caused
agency leadership to prioritize health care.
B. Capability and Capacity Enhancements
Health care promised to be a difficult and risky area of endeavor for
the FTC. The FTC was taking on a powerful industry, and intervening in a
sector of the economy where the use of competition policy was extremely
controversial.96 Although the FTC went “looking for trouble,” it did so in a
way that gave it a fighting chance to succeed.
More specifically, the FTC invested heavily in health policy R&D.
These efforts included influential studies of the impact of advertising
restrictions on health care products and services;97 a major study of the
impact of entry by generic producers on the pricing of pharmaceutical
products;98 and a retrospective examination of the impact of hospital
mergers.99 These research projects set the foundation for the FTC’s
enforcement efforts, including the hospital merger litigation program of the
past decade.100
The FTC also used hearings, seminars, and workshops to gather
95

The authors are grateful to Daniel C. Schwartz for sharing his experiences about the
design of the FTC’s modern health care program in the 1970s. Schwartz served as a
Deputy Director for the FTC’s Bureau of Competition and played a central role in the
formulation of the new program. See also Kovacic, supra note 48.
96
See William E. Kovacic, Measuring What Matters: The Federal Trade Commission
and Investments in Competition Policy Research and Development, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 861
(2005).
97
See Ronald S. Bond et al., Federal Trade Commission Staff Report on Effects of
Restrictions on Advertising and Commercial Practice in the Professions: The Case of
Optometry
(Bureau
of
Economics,
Sept.
1980),
available
at
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/effects-restrictions-advertisingand-commercial-practice-professions-case-optometry/198009optometry.pdf
98
Federal Trade Commission Staff, Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration:
An FTC Study (2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf.
99
Orley Ashenfelter et al, Retrospective Analysis of Hospital Mergers, 18 INT’L J.
ECON. BUS. 5 (2011).
100
Ronan Harty, Interview with Chairwoman Edith Ramirez, 14 The Threshold 1, 6-7
(American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law, Issue No. 2, Spring 2014);
Nuechterlein, supra note 82.

19-Dec-15]

What Do/Should Agency Leaders Maximize?

21

information.101 Among other results, these proceedings led to the
publication of formative reports dealing with competition in health care,102
and the state action doctrine.103 The state action project, in turn, set in
motion a litigation program from which North Carolina Board of Dental
Examiners is the most recent output. Finally, the FTC and DOJ jointly
issued guidelines on antitrust relevant behavior in the health care sector.104
C. Retrospective Evaluation
The two of us have attended hundreds of presentations by
competition agency officials. Such presentations invariably include some
version of the observation, “we’ve been very busy.” Audiences are
generally too polite to respond, “have you been very effective?”
Of course, some level of activity is important for an agency to build
capability, credibility, and legitimacy.105 However, to treat activity levels
as the primary or exclusive measure of performance evades the equally
important issue of effectiveness.
To decide whether a program actually worked, ex post evaluation is
necessary.106 Lots of government programs fail.107 An agency that
routinely conducts ex post evaluation can identify what has worked well
and what needs to be improved. Ex post evaluation is a vital quality control
device, and it should be an automatic feature of the life cycle of
policymaking.
Beginning in the late 1970s, the FTC developed a path-breaking
program to examine the effects of closed competition matters.108 The
program began with an assessment of a monopolization case and various
vertical restraints matters. In the early 2000s, the program was extended to
hospital mergers. The hospital merger retrospective sought to determine the
101

For example, in 2003, the FTC and DOJ jointly held over 20 days of hearings on
Competition and Consumer Protection in Health Care.
102
FTC & Department of Justice, Improving Health Care: A Dose of Competition
(2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/healthcare/040723healthcarerpt.pdf
103
Office of Policy Planning, FTC, Report of the State Action Task Force (Sept. 2003),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/09/stateactionreport.pdf.
104
On the importance of agency guidelines as policy making tools, see Hillary Greene,
Agency Character and the Character of Agency Guidelines: An Historical and Institutional
Perspective, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 1039 (2005).
105
William E. Kovacic, Creating a Respected Brand: How Regulatory Agencies Signal
Quality, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 237, 247-48 (2015) (discussing importance of sustaining
a minimum critical mass of activity).
106
See supra note 87.
107
See Schuck, supra note 6.
108
William E. Kovacic, Using Ex Post Evaluations to Improve the Performance of
Competition Authorities, 31 J. Corp. L. 503 (2006).
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consequences of various hospital mergers that the FTC had unsuccessfully
challenged. The results were vital to the success of a renewed hospital
merger enforcement program, which began with a case again Evanston
Hospital in the mid-2000s, and has since resulted in a string of successes.109
V.
Investment

Striking a Better Balance Between Consumption and

The conflict between consumption and investment may be a policy
perennial, but it does not follow that there is nothing that can be done to tip
the balance a bit more in favor of the latter. Following on Professor James
Q. Wilson, we propose “a few modest suggestions that may make a small
difference.”110 These steps do not depend on agency leadership suddenly
deciding to “do the right thing.”
A. Create A Pro-Investment Norm
Our most general suggestion is the promotion of a norm that
encourages agency leadership to make adequate investments in institutional
capability. At conferences and in other public settings, agency leaders are
invariably asked to discuss the cases they have already launched, and their
plans for initiating new cases. Agency leaders are happy to wax poetic on
such subjects – but we should demand that they do more than brag about
consumption. Agency leaders should be cross-examined about the steps
they are taking to make their agencies better off in the future. Concrete
questions might include:
•

What investments are you making to enhance the capability of
your agency?

•

What are you doing to build your agency’s knowledge about the
commercial settings that it regulates?

•

How many resources are you spending to build better networks
with your fellow regulatory institutions, both at home and
abroad?

•

What steps are you taking to evaluate the results of past
interventions?

•

How should we measure your success in these areas?

If agency leadership knows they will have to answer these questions,
109

Id. at 524-26; Nuechterlein, supra note 82, at 4-5.
JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY
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110
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they will have an incentive to proactively address (and defend) the balance
they have struck between consumption and investment.
B.

Investment Budgets

Currently, agencies publicly report (and trumpet the successes of)
their enforcement efforts, but their investment efforts are invisible. To
redress this disparity, each agency should have to annually report its
investments in capability and capacity, and explain how these investments
will support the agency’s anticipated substantive programs. Just as a public
company reports its R&D budget to potential investors and analysts, each
agency should specify its policy R&D budget. Of course, we do not believe
that each agency should spend a fixed percentage of its overall budget on
policy R&D, nor do we believe that every dollar of policy R&D investment
is of equal value. And, we anticipate no shortage of efforts to “game” the
reporting requirements, by reporting inflated investments in policy R&D.
Still, the process of preparing an investment budget should force agency
personnel to examine whether they are doing enough to set a sound
foundation for the future.
C.

Setting Priorities and Approving Projects

We have both been in academics long enough to see serial rounds of
strategic planning by our respective institutions. The process involves an
endless series of meetings, culminating in the creation of meaningless
mission statements, backed up by hundreds of pages of boilerplate. Lather,
rinse, repeat.
We are hesitant to recommend anything that would force others to
go through the same process. But, agencies will either set their own
priorities, or they will be set for them by outsiders. Since agency leadership
values autonomy, they should be willing to take steps that lower the
likelihood outsiders will seize control of the policy agenda. Accordingly,
agencies should annually identify and publicize their priorities. As with the
investment budget, the process may encourage agency personnel (and
outsiders) to consider what the agency is doing – and whether it is worth
continuing down the same path.
The agency’s process for project approval should involve a similar
set of calculations. Unless the agency has a systematic process for deciding
whether to initiate a new investigation, case, or rule-making project, there
will be little predictability or rationality in the results. And saying “this is
the Chairman’s pet project” is not a sufficient reason for committing public
resources to a project, when the Chairman will not be around to bear the
consequences of that decision. Before green-lighting a project, agencies
should be able to answer the following questions:
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What do we expect to gain if the project succeeds – doctrinal
results, economic impact, enhancement of institutional
reputation and capability?
• What are the risks – doctrinal barriers, political backlash that the
project will arouse, reputational costs if the project fails?
• Who will do the project – is the team to which the project will be
assigned equal to the task?
• How much will it cost, and what projects must we forego if this
one goes ahead?
• How does the project fit within our existing portfolio of existing
commitments?
• How long will it take to accomplish?
• How will we know whether it worked as we hoped?111
Of course, there will often be difficulty in giving confident answers to
these questions, and genuine uncertainty has accompanied many a
successful project. But, a rigorous effort to answer these questions
increases ones’ confidence that the agency has the means to deliver, and is
not engaged in a snipe/snark/shark hunt.112
•

D.

Ex Post Evaluation.

As described above, a routine program of ex post evaluation
provides a valuable feedback mechanism that will allow the agency to
assess whether it has properly matched commitments with capabilities. In
comparing expectations ex ante to outcomes ex post, the agency should
obtain a better sense of how to structure future projects, and how to increase
the prospects for future success. A habit of ex post review also deters
incumbent leaders from launching new projects without considering
potential long-term negative externalities.113
111
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A Few Complications

A. Striking the Proper Balance
Although we have been quite critical of consumption, we are not
suggesting that all consumption is bad. Similarly, although we have praised
investment, we are not claiming that all investment is good. The key is to
strike the proper balance between these two priorities. To date, the balance
has been systematically skewed in favor of consumption. We will not be
able to fix that problem until it is recognized as a problem. After that, we
will have to create the necessary incentives for agency leadership to “do the
right thing.” That approach is far more likely to lead to good results than
any of the alternative strategies; as one of us noted in an earlier article:
[I]f you get the incentives right, most of the big problems
will take care of themselves, leaving a far smaller and more
tractable set of problems to be addressed through regulation,
litigation, and benign neglect. But, if you do not get the
incentives right, no amount of speeches, op-eds, law review
articles, whining and hectoring, moral preening, regulatory
oversight, legislation, lawsuits, or lectures about fairness and
justice can take their place. Reformers should accordingly
focus on getting the incentives right — and legislation that
does not address the underlying incentive problem is not, in
fact, “reform,” no matter what else it may accomplish.114
B. Does it Matter Whether Agency Leadership is a Plank Owner or
a Successor-in-Interest?
Departments, agencies, bureaus and commissions are periodically
created from scratch, but most agency leaders inherit the job from someone
else. The first agency leader is the equivalent of a plank-owner, with
tremendous power to shape the nature of the agency, its personnel, and its
priorities.115 Subsequent leaders are successors-in-interest, who step into
the shoes of their predecessors. As such, they have more limited ability to
re-shape the agency in their image. That said, if prior leadership has made
good investment decisions, the agency will be in better shape – and better
able to withstand the effects of excessive consumption by the latest agency
“How will that look in ten years’ time?”)
114
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head. But, regardless of whether the agency head is a plank owner or a
successor-in-interest, they will each end up making a regular series of
consumption v. investment decisions – and it it those decisions with which
we are concerned. Thus, we do not distinguish between whether agency
leadership is a plank owner or a successor-in-interest.
C. Agency Leadership v. Agency Personnel
We have presented a stylized example of a governmental agency, in
which agency leadership always (or almost always) gets their way. That is
obviously an over-simplification. Agency leadership may be short-term,
but most agencies are full of “WeBes,” who have their own perspective and
priorities.116 The key question – to which the answer is likely to be agencyand leader-specific – is whether agency leadership must consult with the
WeBes about consumption v. investment decisions – and who gets the last
word on the subject. As always, attention to institutional detail is critical
before drawing definitive conclusions.117
D. Operationalizing the Framework
In the abstract, investment is hard to argue with. Everyone knows the
story of the ant and the grasshopper – and the moral (“to work today is to
eat tomorrow”) is hard to argue with. But, “invest more” is spectacularly
unhelpful advice. “Build capability and capacity” is sufficiently vague and
open-ended that almost anything might qualify. Similarly, “consume less”
means that the agency will not be as visible – making it a less credible (and
less faithful) enforcer of its statutory mandate. There are political perils
with consuming too aggressively – but there are perils with withdrawing
from the field, and leaving it unregulated. Finally, people strive to become
agency leaders because they want to advance the goals of that agency – and
bringing cases and initiating rule-making is one of the few ways of doing
just that. Investing in capability and capacity doesn’t result in favorable
press coverage for a good reason – it is boring, and often unproductive.
And, some forms of consumption actually constitute investment, because
they allow the agency to train its personnel – and create the precedents the
agency can then rely on to advance its objectives on a broader plane.118
116
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We agree with these points – but the problem of excessive consumption
is sufficiently pervasive that it demands our attention. Simply stated, we
are not opposed to the building of skyscrapers by agency leaders with an
edifice complex – we just want to ensure that those skyscrapers are built on
a solid foundation.
VII.

Conclusion

Public agency leadership faces a recurring choice between
consumption and investment. Several factors encourage agency leadership
to favor consumption over investment. Predictably enough, this dynamic
creates serious problems, including a mismatch between agency
commitments (made in time t0) and the agency’s (in)ability to deliver good
results (which does not become apparent until time tn).
In this essay, we make the case that greater attention should be paid
to whether agency leadership is investing, rather than consuming.
Investment is the foundation for an effective enforcement agency – and we
should start treating it as such. If we want agency leadership to plant trees,
we need to make it in their interest to do so. Otherwise, instead of behaving
like Johnny Appleseed, agency leaders will continue to follow the Sirens of
consumption.

Dentists (IFD). An index of importance that focused on the total volume of commerce
affected probably would not give much weight to a challenge to a concerted refusal by
dentists in Indiana to provide the x-rays of their patients to insurers. In that sense, IFD is a
comparatively insignificant matter—a small case. Evaluated by its effect on doctrine, the
small case made big law. The Supreme Court’s decision in IFD helped shape modern
jurisprudence governing the rule of reason and the proof of anticompetitive effects.
Among other results, IFD provided a doctrinal foundation for the Justice Department’s
prosecution of Microsoft.”)

